Abstract
Abstract

Introduction
The first real tests of the concept of Network Centric Warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown some serious drawbacks and flaws in the theories behind NCW and its impact on traditional paradigms of command and control.
In a January 1998 article in US Naval Institute's Proceedings, Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski USN, and John J. Garstka, posited the concept of Network Centric Warfare. Expounding upon developments in business models that have applied new information technology, and considered the next great "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), Network Centric Warfare has at its core the concept of linking networks of sensors, decision makers, and individual soldiers 1 with the purpose of achieving shared awareness, increased tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization 2 . Metcalfe's Law (the power of a network is the square of the number of nodes in that network), is a governing concept of NCW, as is the leveraging of information-intensive interactions between the nodes of the network 3 .
In theory, the small-unit soldier who can access information and intelligence from all collection sources will be able to employ combat assets such as air support, artillery, and electronic warfare (EW) with much more precision, timeliness, and effectiveness than what was possible with past capabilities. This superior situational awareness is referred to often as "information superiority", designed to achieve a faster decision-making cycle in relation to the enemy. NCW, essentially, Is intended to compress Boyd's "OODA loop" in order to gain an advantage of decision-making and operational tempo over any prospective enemy 4 .
Emergency Response And The Military Paradigm
There are major differences between the emergency response community and the US Military. Significant distinctions in culture, mission, training, and jurisdictional authority, and there is a uniqueness of skill sets and of expertise in the emergency response 3 The challenges and difficulties faced by the Defense Department in putting the NCW concept into practice ought to prove highly instructive for the emergency responder community.
It is the human dimension of a "networkcentric" approach to emergency response that presents the most formidable set of challenges. Technical obstacles, the size and weight of communication devices, battery life, bandwidth, signal strength, encryption and security, commonality of architecture and software, et cetera, will be overcome by continued development and technical innovation. However, the impact of a "network-centric" emergency response paradigm on capabilities and procedures, on decision-making, and on the behavior of individuals and organizations will be difficult to predict.
Given the potentially massive volume of data and information available, the tasks of establishing a common understanding of events and conditions, and sorting out facts and situations with the appropriate level of detail to support decisionmaking may prove exceedingly challenging in a "network-centric" environment.
• Information Inundation
Theoretically, the NCW approach to information sharing should result in pertinent and timely information being provided to the "shooter" when and where he needs it. But experience has proven that when such a massive amount of data is accessible, it becomes nearly impossible to extract what is pertinent from what is peripheral 6 . The result is "information overload", a cascade of data that exceeds the finite limits of information that can be processed and acted upon by a human being in a stressful and complex multi-tasking environment.
What is new is the potential for inundating all participants with an ever-increasing flow of data masquerading as information because it has been slickly packaged within the common operating picture... …creating strong incentives for all to engage in information overload in an attempt to maintain their bearings in this overly ambitious big picture 7 .
In essence, just as a military "shooter" still needs time to shoot, a responder 6 Intelligence sources at all levels were inundated with information and data that had little bearing on their mission and intelligence requirements… It seemed that all data, information, and products were being pushed through overburdened communications ports with little thought to who needed what and when they needed it… Too much time and bandwidth is wasted by employing the "information inundation" method. 8 Similar observations and complaints from other units and services were common. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) noted that:
At [higher echelons], without the ability to query, the operator had to search reams of information", and that "Lower echelons can be quickly CALL also remarked that in the theater of operations, intelligence analysis personnel were overloaded with information from all sources, and:
…conducted only "minimal analysis" on valuable tactical information provided by Human Intelligence Teams because these personnel reported being so overwhelmed by input that they "don't have enough time during the day to conduct an analysis" 10 .
The above observations are equally applicable to an Incident Commander or EOC Commander who is being bombarded with information of varying quality and usefulness in an attempt to gain situational awareness as his/her command responds to an incident or disaster.
• Unfiltered Information: Getting the Bad with the Good When every information source is treated as a collection asset of equal value, as Metcalfe's Theory would imply, the distinction between evaluated and processed intelligence, and raw, unverifiable information is lost. The latter can often assume the character of rumor and gossip, making it even more difficult for a commander to discern the actual situation. In practice, Metcalfe's Law has proven significantly overoptimistic regarding the contribution of nodes to the value of the network.
Network nodes of similar type and usage history flatten the value equation, and some nodes may actually reduce the overall value of the network because of the adding of undesirable elements. Thus, in a "network-centric" concept, all sources of information are not of equal value, and do not contribute equally to overall situational awareness. Some may actually serve to hinder the accuracy of perceptions and the gaining of situational awareness 11 .
This distraction created by peripheral and irrelevant information often has the effect of slowing the decision-making process, as commanders must process large amounts of obfuscating and sometimes contradictory information.
There is a natural tendency in such circumstances to wait until additional, clarifying information is obtained before making a crucial and time-sensitive decision 12 . This "paralysis by analysis" is often made worse by the decision maker's perception that a key item of information is sure to be included in the next massive influx of data 13 .
• "Network Centric": At Odds With Effective Command and Control
The infusion of information technology into hierarchical organizations typically reduces the traditional asymmetries of information that define superiorsubordinate relationships. Empirically, the "flattening" of command hierarchy regarding information availability and distribution may have 11 Odlyzko, Andrew, & Tilly, Benjamin, (2005) 12 Vego, (2003) 13 adapt quickly and easily to deal with changing situations or unforeseen events and circumstances. The ICS retains the strengths (defined command relationships, efficiency, control) of a beaurocratic hierarchy, enabling preplanning in the more predictable aspects of disaster management, but permits the flexibility to foster and encourage a bias for action, and provides leeway for local improvisation to adapt to unforeseen and often volatile conditions 17 .
• Excessive Control From Above
The "flattening" of the hierarchical ICS command and control structure resulting from unregulated information infusion could erode the strengths of the Incident Command System's beaurocratic organization, negating advantages that allow for commanders to leverage a wide range of expertise and experience to provide direction to the efforts of the responders.
The availability of such a plethora of near-real time information often creates the false impression among commanders that they have as solid and accurate a grasp of conditions and situational awareness as the local responders dealing with an incident at the scene. The result of such an illusion often leads a commander to be overcontrolling with his subordinates, imposing significant restrictions on the initiative of subordinate commanders 18 . Instead of issuing guidance and allowing his subordinates to leverage their expertise to accomplish their tasks and adapt to changing conditions within that guidance, such a commander is prone to issue overly-detailed directives that are irrelevant or inappropriate for the 17 Ibid. 18 Vego, (2003) rapidly-evolving local situation. The infamous Vietnam War parable of President Johnson personally communicating from the White House with Army small-unit leaders in the field while they were in contact with the enemy reminds us that simply because communications are possible, that does not mean they are always a good idea. Such a command and control situation in emergency response is sure to stifle initiative, and will greatly reduce the effectiveness of the efforts of subordinate agencies 19 .
• 20 . If the lower entity's interpretation of events is at odds with that of the higher command, then the risk is of "freelancing" by people acting on their own interpretation (and consequently ignoring the guidance from higher). "Freelancing" is generally defined as illegitimate improvisation that is not working toward the goals of senior Incident Commanders 21 . It is deviation from higher intent that is both unpredictable and unexpected, and such activity presents serious problems to a unified response effort. At its least damaging, freelancing results in a squandering of effort and resources best used differently, while at its worst, it may create dangers for those who are freelancing and for others involved in the response effort whose actions and safety will be impacted.
• Networking for Networking's Sake
The value of an extensively-networked ICC or EOC as a means of gathering real-time information is immense. So great is that value that there is a danger that such a command structure will be employed as an information conduit rather than for its intended purpose of command and control of response efforts 22 .
Interestingly, some NCW advocates in the US Military already have proposed a restructuring of command elements into something radically different from their traditional organization and functional responsibilities. This reorganization to correspond to the major "network centric" tasks that contribute to the commander's "image" (read: situational awareness); tasks such as "image maintenance", "image validation", and "image communication"
23 will mean such a command staff will be functioning more as an information conduit rather 21 Mendonca, et al, (2003) 22 Barnett, (1999) In emergency response, with a host of people such as elected officials, media outlets, and higher-level emergency commands clamoring for the latest information, the temptation is great to think of an EOC or ICC as a supercommunications node. Establishing network connectivity may become an end unto itself, rather than a means to the end for enhancing command and control capabilities. However, it is important to remember that the building of situational awareness, albeit important, is but one task of many for commanders and their staffs, and is a supporting task to the overall purpose of command and control of the resources and people in the field who are dealing with the consequences of critical incidents 25 .
Addressing Challenges and Leveraging Advantages of "Network Centric" Emergency Response
It is certain that there is much to be gained by taking advantage of the technological developments of the last twenty years regarding the collection 24 and dissemination of large amounts of information. Whether this truly evolves into a successful "network-centric" approach to emergency response is difficult to say, but the technology now available and being developed has the potential to be a significant "force multiplier" for emergency responders, making for a more rapid and efficient decision cycle, and a more effective employment of the people and resources available to respond to any incident.
The potential pitfalls of network-centric operations, and the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as those learned in training and exercises, should be the starting point for exploring the impact and consequences of applying information technology to command and control of emergency response organizations.
In order to understand how the availability of such massive quantities of information can be a boon rather than a bane, it is critical for Incident Commanders and other emergency responders to have a clear idea of their information requirements. They must understand what information is pertinent, what is peripheral, and what is extraneous. They also must determine what agencies are the most reliable sources, and how those agencies can provide that information, when it is needed, and in the format required 26 . Though a seemingly simple and common-sense step, identifying those requirements is a highly complex and challenging task. 
• Determining Information Requirements
Each type of incident or event has its own characteristics and its own set of critical information requirements. The type of information required by incident commanders depends on the specific decision they must make. To this end, information must be presented in a form that fits decision-making and situational needs 27 . Emergency responders have trained for many years to understand the characteristics of chemical spills, fires, floods, weather events, accidents, etc., and the likely information commanders will need to know about each. Add the complexities of a modern terrorist attack such as an intentional chemical or biological release, radiological contamination, or devastating explosives, and it is apparent that the potential information requirements across a full threat spectrum are voluminous.
In recent years, emergency responders have worked through these likely terrorist scenarios, using thorough examination of real-world events and training exercises, to study the common characteristics of such events. From this examination, they define the "basic" information that an Incident Commander needs to begin building situational awareness, and validate as much as possible the assumptions about decision-making and resource allocation during such incidents. These "basic" information requirements should be incorporated into standard operating procedures (SOPs) and response plans in which agencies should be well aware of their roles and responsibilities.
When developing specific response plans, emergency responders consider the particulars of such things as terrain, weather, road networks, population, infrastructure, vulnerable entities (such as hospitals or schools), proximity to other potential dangers (fuel or chemical storage, for instance), training level, equipment possessed by local responders, and availability of resources from neighboring communities. These specific conditions and factors weigh heavily in decision-making processes, generating information requirements in addition to the "basic" requirements for an incident or event. These additional requirements also must be outlined in the appropriate response plan.
In responding to an event, an Incident Commander needs to be disciplined in his/her information requests, both to keep lower echelons from having to needlessly spend time gathering and reporting information of questionable value, to avoid an inundation of peripheral information to be processed and assimilated.
The injecting into such complex and dynamic events of technology that allows unfettered communications between any persons or agencies at any time can create a bewildering jumble of information, facts, and rumors that are impossible to digest or even sort out. Such a situation is almost certain to obscure rather than enhance an Incident Commander or EOC Commander's ability to gain situational awareness and exert direction and control over the resources in his jurisdiction.
• Training the Decision-makers and Command Staffs Organizations must develop basic rules and assumptions for the employment of new technology and capabilities, based on experience and expertise. New technology must be tested and assumptions validated, procedures created or modified to most effectively employ that technology. These results must be used to develop and adapt procedures. These procedures need to be practiced and rehearsed using realworld response plans and situations, and the results analyzed so that 29 Erhart & Bigbee, (1999) procedures can be further refined and validated.
Conclusion
Revolutionary information technology is making its way into the domain of emergency response, by virtue of its usefulness and adaptability.
A "network-centric" approach to emergency response is coming to a greater or lesser degree, and in fact is already here.
Its impact upon command and control will be considerable. Emergency responders must be ready for that impact, understand it to the maximum extent possible, and account for it with mature concepts of employment and best practices that were developed and validated during realistic training and analysis.
Despite major differences between the US Military and emergency responders, there is considerable common ground regarding methods of command and control in highly complex and dangerous events. The lessons being learned in the adaptation of Network Centric Warfare by our Armed Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq provide a highly instructive set of lessons to emergency responders as they incorporate the technology and philosophies of a "network-centric" approach to emergency response.
The challenges of integrating new information technology and its unforeseen consequences are significant. Information overload that chokes analysts and decision makers, the flattening of command hierarchies, the subordination of command and control responsibilities to information gathering and connectivity concernsall are real and serious issues that must be resolved.
Yet, in spite of the negative effects this new technology can have upon command and control if misapplied, the vast potential such technology has for improving capabilities, awareness, and responsiveness make its implementation a virtual certainty.
It will be through extensive training, experimentation, practice, and repetition, with lessons learned properly applied, that assumptions will be validated or found faulty, concepts proven or rejected, and the theoretical molded into the practical -that process alone will yield the best practices, policies, and procedures required for the effective employment of new technology.
If history is a guide, the best practices and procedures that emerge from a true network-centric emergency response paradigm are likely as not to bear little resemblance to what was initially envisioned when the technology that drove that paradigm was developed.
